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Abstract
As the United States prepared for the century date change (Y2K) on January 1, 2000,
uncertainty about computer functioning generated uncertainty in capital markets. The
Federal Reserve (Fed) grew particularly concerned that computer malfunctioning would
cause disruptions in the short-term federal funds and repurchase (repo) markets. Many
market participants indicated early in 1999 that they would restrict their normal trading
activities and curtail credit in the weeks leading up to Y2K, which contributed to the Fed’s
anticipation that liquidity might dry up. To ease pressures, the Fed created two special
facilities through the Open Market Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(FRBNY). The Special Liquidity Facility (SLF) provided term collateralized funding to
depository institutions to “ensure that [they had] adequate liquidity to meet any unusual
demands in the period around the period date change.” The Fed designed the facility to have
a spread high enough to discourage its use, while still providing a backstop. Daily borrowing
at the SLF peaked at $1.2 billion on December 30, 1999. The Fed also created the Standby
Financing Facility (SFF) to auction options for overnight repos for dates around the year-end
to primary dealers, which we describe in a separate YPFS case (see Leonard 2022).
Keywords: broad-based emergency liquidity, century date change, discount window, open
market operations, repurchase agreements

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based emergency lending programs. Cases are available from the Journal of
Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
2 The author would like to thank Peter Fisher and Deborah Perelmuter, who worked at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York when the SFF was operational and provided helpful comments on an early draft of this case
study. Their views do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Board of
Governors.
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Overview
As the United States prepared for the century
date change (Y2K) on January 1, 2000,
uncertainty about computer functioning
generated uncertainty in capital markets. In
anticipation of Y2K, the Federal Reserve
System
(Fed)
undertook
significant
preparations—it examined “approximately
90 million lines of [the Fed’s] own code
contained in thousands of programs and had
to remediate approximately 10 percent of
them” (Kelley 2000).
Despite such efforts and similar efforts
undertaken by banks, the Fed grew
particularly concerned that computer
malfunctioning would cause disruptions in
the short-term federal funds and repurchase
agreement (repo) markets (Kelley 2000;
Drossos and Hilton 2000, 1). In early 1999,
many market participants indicated that they
would restrict their normal trading activities
and curtail credit in the weeks leading up to
Y2K, which contributed to the Fed’s
anticipation that liquidity might dry up
(Drossos and Hilton 2000, 1). Additionally, in
the weeks leading up to the century date
change, currency in circulation increased
substantially, as banks prepared for a
possible surge in demand (see Figure 1).

Key Terms
Purpose: To “ensure that depository institutions
have adequate liquidity to meet any unusual
demands in the period around the century date
change” (Board of Governors 1999a)
Launch Dates

July 20, 1999
(Announcement)
October 1, 1999
(Operational)

Expiration Date

April 7, 2000

Legal Authority

Federal Reserve Act of
1913

Peak Outstanding

Peak daily $1.2 billion
on December 30, 1999

Participants

Depository Institutions

Rate

Penalty rate (150 bps)
over federal funds rate
(FFR)

Collateral

Discount-window
collateral

Loan Duration

Repayable any time
before April 7, 2000

Notable Features

2003 discount-window
changes mirrored SLF
design

Providing liquidity around the century’s end
was complicated by a concurrent shift in
monetary policy. Between September and Outcomes
Limited borrowing,
November 1998, the Fed cut rates three
market calmed
times, including one inter-meeting cut, to
anticipate spillover credit tightening from the Russian Ruble crisis and the Asian Financial
Crisis (CNN Money 1998b; 1998a). However, by spring 1999, the Fed grew concerned about
overheating and initiated a tightening cycle, hiking rates in June and August 1999 (CNN
Money 1999b; 1999a).
To ease market liquidity, the Fed created two special facilities through the Open Market
Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY): the Special Liquidity
Facility (SLF), which provided collateralized funding to depository institutions; and the
Standby Financing Facility, which auctioned options to primary dealers on overnight
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repurchase agreements as collateral (Drossos and Hilton 2000, 1). (See Leonard 2022 for a
discussion of the Standby Financing Facility.)
Figure 1: Currency in Circulation

Source: FRBNY 2000, 6.
The Fed created the SLF to “ensure that depository institutions [had] adequate liquidity to
meet any unusual demands in the period around the period date change.” However, the Fed
designed the facility to have a spread “high enough to encourage institutions to make
private-sector arrangements” outside of the discount window, while still providing a
backstop (Board of Governors 1999a; Board of Governors 1999d). The SLF accepted the
same collateral as the discount window and charged a facility fee 150 basis points above the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)’s target federal funds rate (FRBNY 2000, 3). SLF
loans did not have the same use and duration restrictions as discount-window loans. For
example, borrowers were not required to certify that they sought funds elsewhere first4
(FRBNY 2000, 3).
Borrowing from the SLF was limited except on five days: November 4, December 16,
December 27, and December 30, 1999; and January 10, 2000 (Board of Governors n.d.a).
December 31 fell on a Friday; the Fed said that fewer than a dozen banks approached the
Discount-window loans are generally overnight. Prior to 2003, the rate for adjustment credit (replaced by
primary credit in 2003) was set below the target federal funds rate. Partly to discourage arbitrage, borrowers
were required to show that they had exhausted all market sources for credit and were prohibited from
borrowing to fund sales of federal funds. These terms were amended in 2003 (FRBNY 2015; Carlson and Rose
2017).
4
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discount window for special liquidity loans over the last weekend of the year (American
Banker 2000):
On two occasions during these maintenance periods around the CDC [century date
change] when reserves were particularly deficient, once before and once after the yearend, market arbitrage activity of large banks that borrowed at the SLF helped moderate
late-day upward rate pressures that emerged. There had been two earlier episodes
between October 1 and December 15 when arbitrage activity by large banks that
borrowed at the SLF had helped contain late-day rate pressures. (FRBNY 2000, 34)
The Fed published usage of the SLF in its weekly H.4.1 releases. Daily borrowing peaked at
$1.2 billion on December 30, 1999. Daily drawdowns are displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Daily SLF Drawdowns, in $millions

Source: Board of Governors n.d.a.
Outside the SLF, regular discount-window borrowing remained limited throughout the
episode, totaling $233 million in the fourth quarter of 1999 and $236 million in the first
quarter of 2000 (Board of Governors n.d.b).
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Summary Evaluation
The Fed analyzed the effectiveness of the SLF when proposing updates to discount-window
administration in 2002 (Board of Governors 2002, 8). The Fed noted that there were 42
instances of institutions borrowing for a period of two to 10 days and 14 instances of
institutions borrowing for more than 10 consecutive days. The report further stated:
This suggests that the SLF was an attractive source of longer-term, rather than
overnight, funding for some institutions despite the 150-basis-point spread above
market rates, which in turn suggests that those financially sound institutions might not
have had access to cheaper funding in the open market (Board of Governors 2002, 8)
Sources at FRBNY emphasized that the program calmed markets primarily through the
announcement effect. Moreover, they emphasized that there was some concern among the
primary dealers following the SLF announcement that the Fed wouldn’t create a facility
specifically targeted to primary dealers; this was calmed with the announcement of the
Standby Financing Facility (SFF) on August 24, 1999.
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Context: United States 1999–2000

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$9.900 trillion in 1999
$10.436 trillion in 2000
$34,514 in 1999
$36,335 in 2000
Data for 1999:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2000:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA
$5.378 trillion in 1999
$5.775 trillion in 2000
54.33% in 1999
55.34% in 2000
27.48% in 1999
29.63% in 2000
Data not available
Data not available
Data not available
Data not available
0% in 1999
0% in 2000
Yes, up to $100,000 in 1999

Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve created the Century Date
Change Special Liquidity Facility (SLF) as a contingent liquidity facility to provide
liquidity to depository institutions around the century date change.
The Fed first proposed the SLF on May 21, 1999, in a proposed rule change (Board of
Governors 1999f). The Fed received 93 comments from financial institutions through July 2,
1999, with all but three supporting the proposal (Board of Governors 1999a).
In the initial proposal, the SLF was to be active from November 1, 1999, to April 7, 2000
(Board of Governors 1999a). However, in response to comments, the Fed started the facility
a month earlier (Board of Governors 1999a). The Fed published the final rule in the Federal
Register on August 2, 1999 (Board of Governors 1999e).
The Fed created the facility to “ensure that depository institutions [had] adequate liquidity
to meet any unusual demands in the period around the period date change,” though the Fed
designed the facility to have a spread “high enough to encourage institutions to make
private-sector arrangements” outside the discount window while still providing a backstop
(Board of Governors 1999a; Board of Governors 1999d). In the FOMC discussion, committee
members said they expected the SLF to provide “a means for the System’s balance sheet to
expand as we lend to small banks, who may be perceived to be less well prepared than the
large banks to handle any Y2K problems” (FOMC 1999, 4).
2. Legal Authority: The Fed derived the legal authority for the SLF through a
temporary amendment to Regulation A, which it issued under the authority of the
Federal Reserve Act.
The SLF operated alongside the discount window and derived its legal authority from a
temporary amendment to Regulation A (Board of Governors 1999e). The Fed issues
Regulation A under the authority of sections 10A, 10B, 11(i), 11(j), 13, 13A, 14(d) and 19 of
the Federal Reserve Act (Federal Reserve Act 1913). On May 27, 1999, the Fed first published
a proposed update to Regulation A in the Federal Register containing the proposed rule for
comment (Board of Governors 1999d). On August 2, 1999, the Fed published the final rule
in the Federal Register to establish the SLF and specify its terms of operation (Board of
Governors 1999e, 64:4).
3. Part of a Package: The SLF was announced alongside three other measures to
expand discount-window operations around the century date change.
The SLF was part of the Fed’s broad, multi-year preparations for the century date change
(Kelley 2000). On August 24, 1999, one month after the Federal Reserve Board announced
the SLF, the FOMC agreed on a number of further measures. These measures included:
expanded accepted collateral at the discount window, authorization to execute repurchase
agreements with up to 90-day maturities, and the Standby Financing Facility (SFF) (FRBNY
1999). In a press release on September 8, 1999, the FRBNY announced these measures. It
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said their purpose was to facilitate “the smooth functioning of money and financing markets
and . . . to manage banking system reserves” with respect to Y2K (FRBNY 1999).
4. Management: The Federal Reserve Banks managed the SLF.
The Fed authorized the SLF, announcing it through the Federal Register on August 2, 1999
(Board of Governors 1999e). Disclosure and oversight for the SLF were consistent with open
market operations disclosure: the Fed published aggregated data in its weekly H.4.1 reports
(FRBNY 2000, 4). The SLF was administered by the Federal Reserve Banks alongside the
discount window (Board of Governors 1999e).
5. Administration: The SLF was administered alongside the discount window by the
Federal Reserve Banks.
The SLF was managed by the regional Federal Reserve Banks. An eligible institution could
approach its regional Bank to receive a loan as long as the institution could fully collateralize
the loan, as determined by the regional Bank (Board of Governors 1999e). There were no
minimum or maximum limits imposed on a borrowing bank (Board of Governors 1999e).
6. Eligible Participants: Depository institutions in “sound financial condition in the
judgment of the lending Federal Reserve Bank” were eligible for the SLF.
In the proposed update to Regulation A, the Fed suggested that the SLF would be available
only to depository institutions in sound financial condition (Board of Governors 1999d).
Under the proposal, depository institutions that were undercapitalized or critically
undercapitalized, as per ratios set under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, would not be
able to access the SLF. The Fed similarly proposed that only credit unions with a net worth
ratio of at least six percent (“adequately capitalized” as per the Federal Credit Union Act)
would qualify. Several commentators on the proposal warned that “denying access to [the]
institutions [that did not meet these criteria] could cause a public reaction that would
increase the institution’s vulnerability and precipitate customer withdrawals” (Board of
Governors 1999e, 64:41767).
In response to comments, the Fed left the determination of “soundness” at the discretion of
the Reserve Bank. Eligible institutions for the SLF were depository institutions that were in
“sound financial condition in the judgment of the lending Federal Reserve Bank” (Board of
Governors 1999e, 64:41766). In determining soundness, the Reserve Bank was to “take into
account whether the decline owed to temporary balance sheet distortions with the century
date change, as well as the financial conditions of the institution before those distortions
occurred” (Board of Governors 1999e).
7. Funding Source: The SLF was funded through an expansion of the Fed’s balance
sheet.
The SLF was funded through the Fed’s balance sheet (Board of Governors n.d.a).
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8. Program Size: The SLF did not have a pre-determined program size.
The SLF did not have a pre-determined program size (Board of Governors 1999e). Daily
borrowing peaked at $1.2 billion on December 30, 1999. Average daily drawdowns are
displayed in Figure 2.
9. Individual Participation Limits: The SLF did not impose individual borrowing
limits on eligible borrowers.
The Fed stated that borrowers at the SLF would be able to “adjust the amount they borrow
as frequently as they desire” as all loans were fully collateralized and charged a penalty rate
(Board of Governors 1999e). Banks were therefore limited only by the quantity of eligible
collateral they had.
10. Rate Charged: The SLF charged a rate 150bps above the FOMC’s targeted federal
funds rate.
The SLF charged 150bps over the FOMC’s targeted federal funds rate (Board of Governors
1999d, 64:41766). Between October 1, 1999, and November 16, 1999, the SLF charged a rate
of 6.75% (Board of Governors 1999b). This was raised to 7% on November 16, 1999, and
then again to 7.25% on February 2, 2000, in line with revisions to the FOMC’s target for the
FFR (Board of Governors 1999b).
Solicited comments from market participants generally advocated for a lower spread over
the FFR (Board of Governors 1999e, 64:41766). About 70% of comments suggested that the
spread be decreased, with 20% advocating a 50bps spread. Commentators gave a few
reasons for favoring a lower spread. Some stated that the penalty would put an undue
burden on financial institutions, as the rate significantly exceeded their typical cost of funds.
Others stated that the penalty rate would discourage use until “liquidity problems had
become acute.” Some emphasized that the rate would contribute to stigma, discouraging use
(Board of Governors 1999e, 64:41766).
Ultimately, however, the Fed set the SLF’s spread at 150bps, saying that:
The Board believes that a spread of less than 150 basis points might not be sufficient to
assure that many depository institutions still would have incentives to make privatesector arrangements to meet potential shifts in the supplies of, and demands for,
liquidity. Furthermore, a spread of 150 basis points probably is low enough to provide a
reasonable backstop if concerns about the century date change or disruptions associated
with the change itself begin to put strains on funding and credit markets, especially if
these strains are short-lived. (Board of Governors 1999e, 64:41766)
The Fed stated that one difficulty in selecting the spread was that there were “no close
analogues to the facility against which to compare the pricing,” given that the SLF offered
loans without fees and with repayment at any time over the life of the facility without penalty
(Board of Governors 1999e). The Fed compared SLF loans to some Federal Home Loan Bank
(FHLB) advances to members which were priced comparably. The Fed also compared the
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150 basis point spread to the pricing small banks faced through secured lines of credit with
commercial banks (Board of Governors 1999e).
11. Eligible Collateral: Eligible collateral for the SLF was identical with the discount
window.
Eligible collateral for the SLF was identical to the discount window (Board of Governors
1999e). Several commenters on the draft regulation for the SLF requested expansions of
eligible collateral beyond the collateral accepted at the discount window, but the Fed
ultimately kept collateral requirements identical with the discount window. Borrowers were
required to pre-position collateral, to have appropriate authorization to access credit the day
of a request, and all loans were to be “fully collateralized to the satisfaction of the Reserve
Bank” (Board of Governors 1999e). The Board stated, however, that “Staff [would] work
aggressively to expand the range of acceptable collateral and to make collateral procedures
more expeditious and flexible” (Board of Governors 1999e).
12. Loan Duration: SLF loans implicitly had maximum durations equal to the lifetime
of the facility, or until April 7, 2000.
SLF loans could be outstanding “until the program expires,” which was April 7, 2000, so they
had a maturity of up to six months (Board of Governors 1999e). However, section 10B of the
Federal Reserve Act requires that discount-window loans not exceed four months; as the SLF
was authorized under discount window authority, it was subject to section 10B (Board of
Governors 1999e). In the Regulation-A amendment specifying the SLF’s operations, the Fed
stated that as the loans were “payable on demand . . . their maturities do not exceed four
months” (Board of Governors 1999e).
13. Other Conditions: SLF loans were not subject to the same usage requirements as
discount-window adjustment credit.
SLF loans differed from adjustment credit in a few ways.5 First, borrowers at the SLF were
not required to prove that they had exhausted all alternative liquidity sources. Second, the
use of SLF funds was not limited in the same way as adjustment credit. Third, loans from the
SLF did not come with a requirement that “credit be repaid expeditiously; credit [could]
remain outstanding until the program” expired (Board of Governors 1999e, 64:41678).

Prior to 2003, adjustment credit allowed banks to meet reserve requirements on a short-term (typically
overnight) basis by borrowing from their Federal Reserve Bank. Interest rates for adjustment credits were
typically lower than the federal funds rate. Because of stigma at the discount window, very few banks borrowed
adjustment credit from the Fed (FRBNY 2015).
5
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14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The Fed did not mention the impact of
the SLF on monetary policy transmission.
The Fed did not explicitly mention the impact of the SLF on monetary policy; it did not
discuss plans to sterilize operations in authorizing the facility.
15. Other Options: The Fed took comments on the proposed design of the facility. The
Fed also created the SFF to provide liquidity to primary dealers.
As part of the regulatory process, the Fed took comment from market participants on the
proposed design of the facility and responded to proposed changes including changing the
eligibility restrictions to make the program more accessible and lowering the penalty rate
(Board of Governors 1999e). The Fed also created the SFF, a facility that sold options on
repurchase agreements to primary dealers to ensure market functioning through the
century date change (see Leonard, 2022).
16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: Some other countries also took special
measures.
Some other countries also took special measures in anticipation of the century date change.
The Bank of Canada created its own Special Liquidity Facility, with similar characteristics to
the Fed’s SLF.6 The Bank of Canada also expanded the range of collateral accepted in its
standard overnight repo operations, like the Fed (Bank of Canada 1999). The Bank of
England issued special Treasury bills that matured on December 31, 1999, expanded the
range of repo maturities to 90 days, and expanded the range of accepted collateral
(Sundaresan and Wang 2006, 22). Sundaresan and Wang could not find an example of
another central bank that sold options like the Fed’s SFF (Sundaresan and Wang 2006, 22).
17. Communication: Preparations for the century date change began in late June
1995. Chairman Alan Greenspan discussed the facility and the century date
change generally on September 17, 1999.
In late 1995, the Fed created the Century Date Change (CDC) project to coordinate Y2K
readiness across the Federal Reserve system. As part of this plan, the CDC project reviewed
every bank by mid-1998 to assess readiness (Kelley 1997). Between 1997 and 1999, the Fed
published contingency planning guides, brochures on bank readiness, and press releases
explaining the impact of the century date change (Board of Governors 1999c).
The Fed held a Year 2000 Summit to discuss the century date change event, and the actions
that the financial sector and the Fed had taken to prepare for the event. Chairman Greenspan
noted that while the financial sector had generally taken the necessary steps to prepare, and
The Bank of Canada’s Special Liquidity Facility was available to all financial institutions that used the Large
Value Transfer System (LVTS) (Bank of Canada 1999). The facility was created November 1, 1999, and designed
to close March 31, 2000. It accepted a “wide range of collateral including securities and assignments on the loan
portfolio of the borrowing institution” and charged an interest rate equal to the Bank Rate plus 125 basis points.
Like the SLF, loans could be repaid throughout the facility’s lifespan, so they had a maximum maturity of five
months (Bank of Canada 1999).
6
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that “the technical breakdowns that might occur as a consequence of the CDC are readily
containable,” there was evidence that borrowers and lenders were building up liquid assets
to reduce reliance on credit markets. He said that the SLF and the SFF “should help to ensure
an ample supply of liquidity and relieve funding pressures” (Greenspan 1999).
A Fed official spoke to the Wall Street Journal following the announcement of the facility and
explained that the facility would help “banks under pressure that ordinarily wouldn’t be
under pressure” (Newswires 1999).
18. Disclosure: Borrowing at the SLF was published through the Fed’s weekly H.4.1
releases.
The Fed published aggregate borrowing from the SLF in its weekly H.4.1 releases for the
duration of the facility’s operation (Board of Governors n.d.a). Disclosure and oversight for
the SLF were consistent with open market operations disclosures.
19. Stigma Strategy: The SLF did not require that borrowers prove that they had
exhausted funding sources, likely to limit stigma.
Prior to 2003, discount-window adjustment credit was available for depository institutions
at rates below the effective federal funds rate (Carlson and Rose 2017). However, to limit
arbitrage, the Fed required that institutions attempt to obtain funding from private sources
before accessing discount-window credit. This likely exacerbated the stigma associated with
the discount window: to access funds, a distressed institution had to reveal to other market
participants that it faced funding shortfalls (Carlson and Rose 2017).
Likely to limit stigma, financial institutions did not need to “exhaust alternative liquidity
sources” to access SLF funds (Board of Governors 1999e, 64:41678). Sources at FRBNY
indicated that the Fed was aware of stigma and designed the facility to mitigate its effect. In
2003, the Fed implemented changes to the discount window to address stigma—eliminating
the requirement that institutions exhaust private funding sources and instead implementing
a penalty rate—that mirrored the design of the SLF (Board of Governors 2002, 8).
20. Exit Strategy: The SLF was announced with an end-date.
The SLF was announced with an end-date of April 7, 2000, and expired on that date (Board
of Governors 1999e).
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